Institutional Mandate

About

The Center for Federal Accountability (CFA) was chartered to restore the adversarial relationship between the Citizen and the State. We stand on the shoulders of the inspectors, muckrakers, and auditors who came before us.

The Constitutional Necessity

The authority to govern is not assumed; it is enumerated. When the Founders drafted the Constitution, they did not rely on the "goodwill" of administrators. They relied on structural tension.

In Federalist No. 51, James Madison wrote: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition." He argued that the only way to prevent tyranny was to create a system of adversarial checks. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 70, warned that "a feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government," but also that unchecked power invites abuse. Thomas Jefferson, in his Notes on the State of Virginia, declared: "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance."

The Constitution itself establishes this adversarial framework. Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power of the purse—the ultimate check on executive overreach. Article I, Section 9 (the Appropriations Clause) requires that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." Article II, Section 3 commands the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"—not selectively, not partially, but faithfully. Article III vests the judicial power to review executive actions, a principle affirmed in Marbury v. Madison (1803).

The Bill of Rights reinforces this structure. The First Amendment guarantees the freedom of the press and the right to petition the government—tools of accountability. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches, requiring that government surveillance be authorized by law. The Fifth Amendment ensures due process, preventing arbitrary government action.

The CFA exists to be that counter-ambition. We treat Article I, Section 9 (the Appropriations Clause) and the Fourth Amendment (Protection against Unreasonable Search) not as guidelines, but as rigid operational constraints. We enforce the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552), the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a), and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.) as the statutory foundation of transparency. When the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Nixon (1974) that "the public has a right to every man's evidence," it affirmed our mandate: the government's secrets are not absolute.

Our Historical Model

We are not the first to recognize that government cannot audit itself. The tradition of adversarial oversight predates the Republic. The "Muckrakers" of the early 1900s—Ida Tarbell exposing Standard Oil's monopolistic practices, Upton Sinclair revealing the meatpacking industry's abuses, Lincoln Steffens documenting municipal corruption—proved that investigative journalism could force accountability when official channels failed.

We model our operational doctrine on the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (1941), commonly known as the Truman Committee. While the world was at war, Harry Truman drove thousands of miles to construction sites and factories. He did not rely on the War Department's reports. He looked at the concrete. He checked the books. His committee saved the taxpayer billions and likely shortened the war by exposing waste and corruption.

"I am not interested in the 'why' or the 'how much.' I am interested in the 'what.' Show me the steel. Show me the contract."

— Operational Philosophy of the Audit

The modern era of accountability journalism was forged in the 1970s. The Pentagon Papers (1971) revealed that successive administrations had systematically lied to the American people about the Vietnam War. The Watergate investigation (1972-1974) exposed a pattern of criminal conduct at the highest levels of government, leading to the first resignation of a U.S. President. The Church Committee (1975-1976) uncovered decades of illegal surveillance and assassination plots by intelligence agencies, resulting in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Inspector General Act of 1978.

The CFA applies this same "boots-on-the-ground" philosophy to the digital age. We do not accept the Agency's press release. We download the database. We read the source code. We verify the "steel." Like the Truman Committee, we go to the source. Like the Church Committee, we follow the paper trail. Like the muckrakers, we publish the evidence.

The Modern Failure

For the last fifty years, the mechanisms of oversight have slowly eroded. The institutions designed to check executive power have been systematically weakened, captured, or defanged.

  • The Inspectors General are frequently fired or marginalized when their investigations touch political nerves. The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) was intended to create independent oversight, but recent administrations have removed IGs who uncovered inconvenient truths. The firing of multiple IGs in 2020 demonstrated that the position's independence is conditional on political convenience.
  • The GAO produces high-quality work, but lacks enforcement power; their recommendations often sit on shelves for decades. The Government Accountability Office's reports are comprehensive and rigorous, but they cannot compel action. Agencies routinely ignore GAO findings, knowing there are no consequences.
  • The Press has largely abandoned technical investigative reporting in favor of political punditry. Newsrooms have cut investigative teams, and the remaining journalists lack the technical expertise to audit complex systems. The result is coverage that focuses on personalities rather than policy, on scandals rather than systemic failures.

This erosion has created a vacuum. In the absence of oversight, the bureaucracy has expanded its powers through "Secret Law"—spending money that was never appropriated and building surveillance systems that were never authorized. The Freedom of Information Act is routinely violated, with agencies claiming broad exemptions and delaying responses for years. The Privacy Act of 1974 is ignored when convenient, with agencies collecting data without publishing required System of Records Notices (SORNs). The Administrative Procedure Act is circumvented through "guidance documents" that have the force of law without the transparency of rulemaking.

The Supreme Court's decision in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee (1989) established that FOIA's purpose is to "shed light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties," yet agencies routinely deny requests that would do exactly that. The court's ruling in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977) affirmed that executive privilege is not absolute, yet modern administrations claim ever-broadening secrecy powers.

The Legal Foundation

The CFA operates under the statutory authority granted to all citizens by the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552). Enacted in 1966 and strengthened in 1974, FOIA establishes the public's right to access government records. The Act's purpose, as stated in its text, is to ensure "an informed citizenry" that can "check against corruption and hold the governors accountable to the governed."

The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a) requires agencies to publish System of Records Notices (SORNs) when they collect personally identifiable information. The Act mandates that agencies cannot collect data beyond what is specified in their published SORNs. We audit agencies against this requirement, exposing when surveillance systems operate without legal authorization.

The Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.) requires agencies to follow formal rulemaking procedures when creating binding regulations. Yet agencies increasingly use "guidance documents" and "interpretive rules" to create de facto law without public notice or comment. We track these violations and publish the evidence.

These statutes, combined with the constitutional framework of separation of powers, provide the legal foundation for our work. We are not creating new law; we are enforcing existing law. We are not proposing reforms; we are documenting violations.

The Philosophical Mandate

The principles underlying the CFA trace to the Enlightenment thinkers who influenced the Founders. John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government, argued that government exists by the consent of the governed and that when it exceeds its authority, the people have the right to resist. Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the Laws, articulated the doctrine of separation of powers—that legislative, executive, and judicial functions must be divided to prevent tyranny.

The American system of checks and balances is built on this foundation. Each branch of government is designed to check the others. But what happens when all three branches fail? What happens when Congress defers to the executive, when the courts defer to agency expertise, and when the executive claims ever-expanding powers?

The answer lies in the public trust doctrine—the principle that government holds power in trust for the people. When government violates that trust, the people have not only the right but the duty to expose the violation. The First Amendment's guarantee of a free press is not a privilege; it is a structural requirement of democratic governance.

George Washington, in his Farewell Address, warned against "the insidious wiles of foreign influence" and the danger of "permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations." But he also emphasized that "the basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government." That right requires information. That right requires accountability.

The Founding of the Bureau

The Center for Federal Accountability was organized as a private, non-partisan research bureau to fill this oversight gap. We are structured as a private LLC, not a 501(c)(3) non-profit, to maintain absolute independence from any potential "chilling effect" of tax-exempt status. We accept $0 in government funding. We are funded by subscriptions and corporate risk auditing services.

We are not a "Think Tank." We do not publish policy papers suggesting how government should work. We are not an advocacy organization. We do not lobby for specific policy outcomes.

We are an Audit Bureau. We publish Indictments of Fact regarding how government does work. Our output is a set of findings that can be audited, cited, and litigated—because the underlying artifacts are public. We follow in the tradition of organizations like ProPublica, which uses investigative journalism to hold power accountable, and the Government Accountability Project, which protects whistleblowers and exposes government misconduct.

Our independence is our strength. We answer to no political party, no government agency, no corporate sponsor. We answer only to the evidence and to the public interest. As the Supreme Court recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." We ensure that debate is also informed by facts.

"Custodiet Ipsos Custodes"

Who Watches the Watchers?

See The Evidence

History provides the mandate. Data provides the proof. See how we triangulate the truth.